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"The relationship between the United Europe and the US in the world of the 21st century" - Speech by Valérie Giscard d'Estaing at the Georgetown University

I’m very pleased to have been invited by you to discuss, first by speech and then by question and answers, this very important and vital issue of the diplomacy of tomorrow, that is the relationship between the European Union and the US into the world of the 21st century. Dean Gallucci, you spoke mainly of the 20th century, and now I will speak of another one.

Owing to the pressures of our media civilization, we are tempted to focus more on current issues and less on questions of the future.

Our former written civilization, to which I belong, helped us to understand the past and the so-called lessons of history. Today’s media civilization is adapted to analyzing the world as it is, with its tensions and debates, but the future remains blank.

When we do think of the future, our natural instinct is to go on thinking on the same old lines. If we are more sophisticated, or better educated, like you are all here, we use tangential trends. Anyway, all our work is based on existing factors, with little room left for innovative events.

Of course, you know all this. But I am repeating it as a sort of protection because we still embody and reflect all the past components of our national history and culture, which we tend to repeat indefinitely.

Let’s take the case of today’s topic.

The relationship between the US and Europe in fact continues to be based on bilateral relations. When US leaders consider Europe, they still see it as a mosaic of national States; they analyze Europe’s reactions in terms of national positions, sometimes going so far as to distinguish, ineptly, between the “old” and the “new” Europe.

And it goes both ways. Germany, France, Italy, Spain and of course the UK adopt positions vis-à-vis the US, paying little, or no attention at all, to European solidarity.

This can be understood: France and Britain were dominant world powers—France in the 17th and 18th centuries, in fact from the Westphalia Treaty (1648) to the Vienna treaty of the Napoleonic Wars, and Britain toward the 19th century until the beginning of the first world war – and at that time the United States was a distant, marginal power, or at least perceived as such. When the new might of the US emerged, France had been weakened by the First World War, and in spite of the victory, Britain, or perhaps because of it, its huge contribution to the victory, was weakened also.

When decisions have to be taken in the sphere of Anglo-American relations, leaders and public opinion naturally put them in the context of the continuing “privileged relationship” which history, a common language, and close alliance during World War II have fostered between the two countries.

In the case of France, the French-American bilateral relationship is a lot more friendly than it appears, I presume to say so in front of the French ambassador, which certainly will support this views! The two countries have never been at war and have always been allies. The periodic tensions between the two countries flare up for probably two reasons: French sensitivity to anything affecting its independence or which appears to put it in a situation of inferiority. This was the reason for which General de Gaulle’s decision to pull France out of NATO, it was not a strategic view, it was a perception, and I won’t go into details of the situation which put France into a sort of situation of inferiority; and the second reason is the difference between the two models of society, one being judged excessively free-market and capitalist, and the other, judged too interventionist and Statist. And of course, the difference varies depending on the successive majorities in power in the two countries.

As for the bilateral approach with Germany, the country was the darling of American diplomacy for decades. Its democratic regime, rebuilt in fact by the United States on the ruins of Nazism, America’s determined support for Berlin’s security, and Germany’s solidarity during the Cold War created a sort of alliance which is special, an alliance of dependence which suited both sides. The United States took a dim view of the stirrings for autonomy and then of Germany’s independence, which culminated in its categorical refusal to be part of the coalition in the second war in Iraq.

Europe hasn’t counted for much in all this! In the past 50 years, as you mentioned Mr. Anderson, relations between the United States and the countries of Europe have kept a bilateral character, or multilateral through NATO. American leaders when they have expressed views have continued to consider Europe a constellation of States vaguely linked among themselves through an opaque organization. They have given scant importance to the annual EU-American summits that have lacked decision-making power, and where their president, your president, has met with an interlocutor whom he never saw again because of the rotating EU presidency.

On their side, the European States have preferred to keep their relations with the US on a direct footing, taking into consideration their security needs and also the mood of their voters. The sole exception, but it’s an important one, is international trade; in this area, because of the Rome Treaty, relations are managed comprehensively at the level of the European Union on the one side and the United States by the qualified representatives of the two entities. So that’s the present Institutions, the Institutions of yesterday.

There are certain signs which seem to suggest a possible shift in this network of ancient bilateral relations. Let me mention just two:

On issues as difficult as Iran’s uranium-enrichment policy, all of the European countries, led by Germany, France and Britain, have adopted a common position, different, according to certain aspects, from the one advocated by the United States, and they have maintained a common position throughout the lengthy negotiation process.

The other sign is the fact that the American press, or the international press, increasingly refers to “European” positions, rather than national ones, In the headlines, “EU” now replaces “Britain” or “France.” This is particularly true in the monetary sphere, where quotations for the euro now precede or replace national currencies.

So how are we to conceive of EU-US relationship in the 21st century?

The answer depends, I think, on two elements. Will Europe be sufficiently united to constitute a valid interlocutor for the United States? And what might then their future partnership consist of?

Europe is moving towards unity. Of course it is meeting obstacles on the way, it’s normal, it’s a historical process through which at this time the United States has gone through, but its objectives are clear and they are spelled in documents signed by all the European leaders, including our British friends.

The first of these documents is the Treaty on European Union, usually known as the Maastricht Treaty, signed on February 7, 1992. The Article 2 states this:

“The Union shall set itself the following objectives: (…) to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense.”

It is very clear, it is now almost 15 years ago, and the Title V of the Treaty sets out the conditions in which “the Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy,” including relationship with the United States.

So the intentions are clearly indicated in the Treaty, but the institutions were not there to implement them: the EU, for instance, has a rotating presidency, no foreign minister, and undemocratic voting rules.

The second document is the draft Constitutional Treaty prepared by the European Convention which met in 2002 and 2003 and which was loosely, but consciously, modeled on the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787. I can tell you that during all that period I have read, not all of course because there are so many, but many books. It was the working of the Philadelphia Convention, and many brilliant biographies are published including now about the actors of the event. Our work, the draft Constitutional Treaty calls for:

- a European Union president appointed for two and a half years, with the possibility of being renewed once; which means normally a five-year term

- a foreign minister appointed for five years who would be ex officio a member of the Council, it will not be second-level foreign representative, he will be at the same level of the Ministers. He would formulate EU foreign policy according to the Council decisions.

- a democratic voting system: all the future EU decisions have to be adopted by a majority of member States representing over half of the citizens of Europe, I won’t go into the details and figures, but this idea of a true majority, is the majority of States to protect the small States, and the majority of people to protect the opinion of the European voters in the Union

This treaty is at this moment subject to ratification by the member States like it happened for the Philadelphia Constitution. Let me just give you briefly the picture at this point:

- We are 27 Member States now :
- of the 27, 18 have already ratified it, representing already two-thirds majority;
- 2 are preparing to ratify without major problems: Ireland and Portugal, it will make a total of 20

- Of the 7 others:
- 2 have said no to the referendum, France and the Netherlands
- 2, appear, out of the 7, to favor the text
- and only 3 haven’t come out one way or the other—Britain, the Czech Republic and Poland. If you look at the detail of evolution of public opinion and leaders, it seems that in Poland a growing majority of Poles support now the European Union;

So how might things evolve?

To complete ratification, it would be necessary for the two States that have said no to change their position.

The French are due to elect a new president and a new National Assembly in May and June.

Until then, it would have served no purpose to re-open the debate on Europe. The context would be too negative. But afterwards, the situation will be different.

The issue could be examined then. If the answer is affirmative, the process could be taken to its conclusion, the process of the constitutional treaty, with the exception of Britain and for a while, of the Czech Republic. Some kind of “opting out” formula will have to be devised for these two countries, on the lines of what was done when the euro was introduced. You know that 13 countries adopted the Euro and some others opted out.

Given that scenario, the European Union will have efficient institutions in 2008, ahead of the European elections of 2009.

And the United States will have opposite it a structured interlocutor with which it could then begin a real dialogue. * * *

So what might a balanced Euro-American partnership consist of?

First, such a partnership is natural because it is based on the same values that have emerged from a common civilization.

It won’t be primarily a military alliance since actions in this field continue to be discussed in NATO, which will likely have been reformed.

Its role would be more that what I will call a partnership for global influence.

There are in the world today as you know 190 States, one or two more, and you find differences amongst them on the same line as we have differences within Europe: a few very large States, by virtue of their population or territory, like the US, China, India, Russia; a group of medium-size States having strong regional influence; and States with smaller populations, which are by far the most numerous and cannot be ignored.

The United States and United Europe belong to the first group (whereas European states taken individually belong to the second and third group). The combined population of the US and United Europe will be fewer than that of China or India but it will represent about 12 to 13% of the population of the globe. At the same time, when you look at the GNP, collective GNP, at the nominal rate of change, all together, we represent more than 60% of the total of the world GNP, which indicates the importance of such a partnership.

But Europe and the US have a whole raft of shared, deeply ingrained values, which means that they never will and can’t be adversaries. These values are not identical; for instance it was stated a few days ago here in Washington by Jim Baker, that for the US, it’s democracy plus market economy, and for Europe, no. It’s democracy plus market economy with a human dimension, you can say human, you can say social, but it’s not only the market economy. And also, on the other side, the support for an international legal system. But basically, the values are the same. So our analyses may diverge, our interests may sometimes be at odds, but the community of values preclude this from leading to any sort of conflict.

That is what we need to seek, in fact, a partnership of values.

Such an approach entails certain consequences:

-Given the similarity of values, the solutions to problems should normally be the same. Here, it’s the word “normal” which is important. It means forming the habit, vis-à-vis the outside world, of expecting a common position to be upheld.

- The system of consultations for that purpose will have to be more efficient. It doesn’t need to be formalized through a text, but it will have to be organized carefully to be regular and visible. The interlocutors on the European side would be the president of the European Union assisted by the foreign minister, who would also be the vice president of the Commission. That means, for the specialists here, that the Commission president will normally not attend so as to avoid any confusion in duties.

- Bilateral relationships will obviously continue to exist, Mr. Ambassador, you are safe, and there will still be meetings in the future between delegations, but the format will have to be adjusted: They will have to focus exclusively on strictly bilateral matters, without straying into questions that fall within the Euro-Atlantic partnership.

- Each of the parties will have to stop interfering in the other’s affairs, especially bringing bilateral pressure to bear in the other’s sphere, while trying to divide its partner. That’s a dangerous game which destroys the spirit of partnership. This observation applies to the United States, which is united when Europe remains divided. In particular, the EU’s eventual enlargement to new members is a strictly European matter in which the United States has no reason to intervene.

- The Euro-Atlantic partnership of values will have to ensure that it does not antagonize other cultures and other values. When I quoted the important 60% of the GNP together it means the rest of the world may have a perception of isolation or frustration, and we must respect other cultures and other values. There are universal values such as human rights and freedom. But there are also other civilizations and cultures, other social approaches, and we have to respect their right to exist. * * *

It would be pretentious and imprudent to try to describe the stakes the partnership between the United States and United Europe will face in the 21st century.

All we can say is that the world is changing rapidly in demographics, economy and culture. We will have to deal with more populous States than our own, with economies growing as powerful as ours, and cultures that do not necessarily recognize the superiority of our values.

To build such a partnership, we will have to negotiate two successive obstacles:
The first is up to Europe: It will have to successfully conclude its project for union; otherwise there will be no United Europe to partner the United States of America;

And the second will depend upon the United States: it will have to move from a situation of dominance, which in a sense is natural with the level of power of the US, militarily and economically, to the position of being a partner. It doesn’t mean equal partnership, it means mutual recognition. And I hope this evolution will be accepted.

But don’t our own values of freedom, tolerance and generosity demand we achieve such a partnership?