Brussels, May 15 2004

(...) I don’t think it’s possible to go much further with everyone gathered around a table repeating what each one wants. I think the Irish presidency has to be able to decide now on the center of gravity of the agreement. So much for the method if we want to wrap things up on June 18 as I believe necessary and possible. In other words, it’s no longer useful for us all to be there, repeating what we each want.

With respect to the substance, I think we have a qualified majority on one issue, the center of gravity with regard to judicial cooperation. France wants this. I don’t think there will be any going back. (...) On another question, I’m less optimistic—that’s the least I can say—and that’s the tax issue. Others will say why and for what reason they don’t want to move forward. I still fail to understand why we can’t have qualified majority voting for matters affecting the satisfactory functioning of the internal market and just that—we’re not talking about taxes on citizens and income tax, we’re talking about a few modest matters relating to corporate taxation in the context of the internal market and its functioning satisfactorily. We must note the fact that there’s a sticking point there. I’m a bit more hopeful on the social dimension. We’ve put forward some new proposals. Again, they’re not revolutionary. (...) I also floated a reasonable request about social protection for migrant workers and also the termination of labor contracts. We could take a pragmatic approach there in qualified majority decisions. I didn’t sense any contradiction or such strong opposition on these issues as on tax questions.

Lastly, I think I made the point rather strongly, and I was supported on this, that one cannot stall the progression of qualified majority and at the same time wish to restrict the possibility of enhanced cooperation. So I think that the Convention text on enhanced cooperation should be maintained. The philosophy behind enhanced cooperation, and even structured cooperation on defense issues, is that we are all on the same road, all of us together, not on different paths, and that on this road under certain conditions a group of countries—they may be old or new, big or small—may wish to move ahead a bit, be trailblazers. If this possibility didn’t exist under the Treaty, I think I can say that these countries would be tempted to take another path outside the Treaty, and we’d see Schengen arrangements proliferating in the political, military and other areas. Our whole effort, which France supports, has been for everything to take place in the framework of the Treaty for philosophical reasons and for the morale of the Union, with everybody on good terms. So enhanced cooperation in general and structured cooperation on defense issues are in line with this philosophy of common action and at the same time allow countries that want to move ahead on the common path to do so. I think that this idea has also gained acceptance.

So that’s the situation on the non-institutional questions. We discussed the Commission. The idea was brought up again of a Commission where there would be fewer commissioners than member states; this idea has already been accepted by everyone--by the Fifteen and in the accession treaty of the new members, by the new member states. Under the Nice Treaty, once the Union has 27 members or 25 + 2, there will be fewer commissioners than member states from that point on. That idea was accepted. What wasn’t stipulated in the Nice Treaty is the mode of application. So we’re looking into this. I repeated a long-standing conviction, and for me it was reinforced in the five years I’ve just spent as commissioner, that the collegiate approach is the key to the general interest, the collegiate alchemy which from my point of view just isn’t possible if there are too many people. At the same time, there’s a legitimate concern that all states have, namely equal treatment. How do you reconcile that? By anticipating as soon as possible--I’m thinking personally of 2009, it would be better after a period with 25 commissioners—the return to a smaller commission of 15 or at a maximum 18 members, based on the principle of equality. And in fact I repeated to my colleagues what you’ve heard me say several times: each country has one commissioner, say until 2009, all at the same time.

After 2009, not all at the same time. But each country keeps one commissioner. That’s what needs to be explained because it’s the truth. Equal treatment. Each commissioner has equal status with the others, a right to vote like the others, whether he’s from a large or small country; simply, for a while some countries will not have nationals in the Commission.

Some wanted to be “represented” in the Commission for two terms out of three. That may be reasonable. In any case, I warned, with my perspective and my own experience, that the Commission would be weakened by being too large. It’s in no one’s interest for the Commission to be weak; it is central to the Community model, and things are going to be more complicated for its functioning in general and probably the general interest will be more difficult to find because we’re a larger number of countries. So at all cost, the Commission must be preserved. My impression from the discussions, which aren’t over, is that this idea is gaining acceptance.

Without giving away the content of the deliberations, I’m sure you will be hearing other accounts. […] I can understand a certain number of reservations. But I have trouble understanding why we would back away from the text adopted in Naples, on which there was a rather broad consensus that included the British and other countries. We’re not inclined to finger this country or that. My inclination is to work, to encourage an agreement that doesn’t undermine the consensus that I observed as a commissioner in Naples.

Listen, frankly, I can’t imagine, at this point in our negotiations—really the last few meters in the final lap, given the current international climate, with concerns about security, terrorism, social and economic unrest—I can’t imagine that the heads of state and government won’t finish in June. I prefer to operate on the assumption that there will be an agreement. […] But to elicit that agreement, the Presidency must assume its responsibility, take the necessary risk of putting a draft agreement on the table, and we will support that approach.

There must be a global package. I believe that the elements noted by the Irish Presidency, the elements of a global package, now exist. Once again, frankly, the Irish Presidency did a good job. The Irish prime minister too.

I’m neither optimistic nor pessimistic, I’m determined. That’s what Jean Monnet used to say.

[…]

I think the Nice Treaty is useful in the short term. The short term, that’s where we are now. Seriously, in order for this enlarged Europe with 25 or 30 countries to work, we need a certain number of tools, apart from a clear and readable text. Don’t forget all the Convention’s work. […] I don’t want the few points that are under discussion or debate, points that are about power, in fact, to obscure what was accomplished by the Convention, which was considerable—which was a real Treaty that was new from the perspective of policy, citizens’ rights, the institutions themselves and the EU’s objectives. But there are new tools in this Constitution that we need relating to foreign policy, defense, the qualified majority and structured cooperation. We need all these tools so that the EU can keep moving forward.

[…]

I think the Irish Presidency, which I will be meeting with, will evaluate the discussion we had today. Their feeling is a bit like mine, that this exercise has reached its limit. I think the elements exist to take the necessary and useful risk of proposing a global agreement.

I can’t say. Quite frankly, I’d like to see a signal first./.