Today's Date:

I. Consolidating stability in Afghanistan and the Balkans is one of our highest political priorities in the coming year. We must ensure that NATO’s contribution is tailored to our strategy.

1. In Afghanistan, NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul in August. We subsequently decided that ISAF could support the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), particularly the German one in Kunduz. Finally, we authorized the ISAF temporarily to deploy outside Kabul.

These important decisions reflect our determination to make a success of the international community’s strategy for which 2004 will be a key date, with the elections marking the completion of the political process defined in Bonn.

These objectives are ambitious. They will require significant capabilities. NATO’s military authorities told us in October that if we wanted to extend the Force’s missions, the allies would have to provide 9,000 to 11,000 extra men.

This preliminary assessment of military needs compels us to ask ourselves: are we ready to commit the necessary resources? Above all, by doing this aren’t we modifying our strategy?

France, who has had soldiers in ISAF for nearly two years, intends maintaining her support for the Bonn Process and will keep her contingent in Kabul. She will also continue her effort vis-à-vis training for the Afghan army programmes which we are carrying out with our American friends.

But I believe it necessary to signal that our action will have to be consistent with subsequently handing over responsibility to the Afghan authorities. This is why training the Afghans must be our priority. Our strategy must not be to take over from the Afghans the task of securing their country, but remain one of helping them take responsibility for it themselves.

2. Another theatre in which we are engaged: the Balkans.

For over ten years, the whole international community and particularly NATO has been committed to restoring security and stabilizing the Balkans. Considerable progress has been made, but the situation remains difficult. We must maintain our effort both to stabilize the region and anchor it firmly to Europe.

In Kosovo, we have to maintain a robust military presence while pursuing the restructuring of KFOR so as to use it more effectively. My country will take command of KFOR in October 2004 and is counting on all participants maintaining their efforts.

In Bosnia, we must also pursue the restructuring of SFOR and prepare for transferring responsibility to the European Union at the end of the SFOR operation. We can be pleased with the work accomplished under NATO auspices in restoring peace and stability in that country. Relief of SFOR is now possible. We think nevertheless that the importance of the stakes warrants the EU mission taking over from SFOR including a significant military component. We are expecting this military component to be organized in cooperation with NATO in the "Berlin Plus" framework. We shall thus prove the concrete benefits for security in Europe of fruitful and trusting cooperation between the EU and NATO.

France herself will maintain her commitment, currently over 4,000 men, in the Balkans and particularly in KFOR. In Bosnia too, as in Kosovo, our objective must be to enable the local authorities to honour their responsibilities without us usurping their role. The inclusion, when the time comes, of Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Partnership for Peace will, I hope, contribute to this process.

II. Chairman, you spoke too about NATO's transformation.

1. France supports the transformation process launched in Prague. We are participating in the NATO Response Force, the NRF. We are providing nearly a quarter of the NRF's military capabilities. This contribution attests to the importance we attach to the Alliance having the means to retain its relevance in the face of the new challenges we are encountering.

Concurrently, the Alliance has initiated a debate on the adaptation of its decision-making processes. I believe that, in this sphere, technical improvements are indeed possible, particularly to allow the Council to make swifter analyses of situations in order to speed up its decision-making.

But our concern for speed and adaptation will have to respect the principles which underpin our alliance and make it so valuable: consensus and solidarity between allies on the one hand, and the primacy of the political authority for defining the framework of military action on the other.

2. May I too, Chairman, on the subject of NATO's transformation, comment on the development of its relations with the European Union.

With the implementation of the "Berlin Plus" arrangements, the Alliance has given its support to the development of the European Security and Defence Policy, the ESDP. I should like to reaffirm, in this context, our intention to make progress on the ESDP in harmony with our commitment within the Alliance.

Our effort, with the negotiation of a Constitution for Europe, must enable the EU to reach another milestone. In this, as before, we shall, in the EU, remain mindful of the need for consistency with the commitments we make in NATO. At the end of the day, can it be otherwise, given that the great majority of EU members are members of NATO and vice versa?

We firmly believe that the Alliance, transformed by both its relationship with the EU and its own decisions, will be all the more capable of tackling the challenges of today and tomorrow.

3. The Alliance Istanbul summit will be the opportunity we need not just to take stock of our action, but also to gear it to the future. I myself can identify some priorities:

- Europe's security must today be based on a stable environment. We saw for ourselves the need for this in the Balkans and acted in consequence. We must also think of our own immediate neighbourhood, the Mediterranean. We have dialogue partners there. We shall be able to ponder with them the challenges we encounter and the means to address them together, in areas to which NATO brings added value.

- Relations between NATO and the European Union: the ESDP, which the new Constitution will develop, will also depend on the arrangements concluded with NATO. The forthcoming phase, with the relief of SFOR, will, with due regard for the autonomy of decision-making of both NATO and the EU, see the consolidation of this cooperation in crisis-management. Istanbul could be the opportunity to demonstrate it. (...)./.