Today's Date:

AMB. LEVITTE: I'd like to start with three general remarks. The first one is about friendship between the United States and France, because when I read the papers or look at the TVs -- on both sides of the Atlantic, I must say -- from time to time I wonder if the war is not between the U.S. and France and not about Iraq. (Laughter.) Let me say that during the early days of the fight for independence of the United States, France was side by side with American friends. America saved France twice last century during the two world wars. We will never forget that. And our friendship is strong. It is a treasure and it must be maintained, protected, preserved, and that's my duty. And I think that in France, you will always see a strong friendship towards the American people. I wanted to start with that, because I think that's essential.

Now, a second remark is about the use of force. France does not exclude the use of force. We participated fully in the first Gulf War with more than 10,000 troops, over 100 planes and so on. We participated fully in the war in Bosnia.

In fact, President Chirac, together with the British prime minister, established the Rapid Reaction Force, which changed the war and led to a peaceful settlement. We participate fully in Kosovo. In Ivory Coast, we have now over 3,000 troops, and we helped American children to be evacuated when they were in danger a few weeks ago.

In Iraq, we don't exclude the use of force, and Minister de Villepin said, and I quote, on the 5th in New York during this meeting of the Security Council, "If the inspections were to fail and take us to a dead end, then we rule out no option, including, in the final analysis, the recourse to force." That is our position. It has always been. And it will remain our position.

All in all, now we have over 12,000 troops deployed in Afghanistan, where the U.S. and France are the two, and the only two, countries training the new army of Afghanistan; in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Africa, elsewhere.

The new fight is against terrorism, and here again, we have wonderful cooperation with our American friends. It is the major challenge of the day, and on that also we are side by side, and quite successful, I must say.

My third general remark is about the mood in Europe about a possible war in Iraq. You know what the polls show. In France, 80 percent of the population is against the war. But not only in France. If you look elsewhere in Europe, you'll see that the percentage is roughly the same in Italy, in Spain, in Russia, elsewhere. So the question is, why? Why is there such a difference between the mood in the United States and the mood in Europe? And I think it's important that we address that question to understand a bit better what are the reasons of our position.

There are, in my view, three explanations, three reasons why the mood is so different in Europe. The first one is about the main threat; what is today, from a European perspective, the main threat to our security in Europe. And I would say by far, and for us it's obvious, the main threat is al Qaeda. It is al Qaeda simply because we are under threat today.

Our services, our intelligence say that never since the Algerian war, 40 years ago, France has been under such an immediate, urgent threat. And these are not only words, remember that a few months ago we had 11 Frenchmen, French citizens, killed in a suicide bombing in Karachi. A few months ago, we had a huge tanker, the Limburg, attacked by al Qaeda off Yemen. And in December, we arrested a dozen of Algerians, or French from Algerian origin, who were closely linked to al Qaeda and were planning attacks in Paris. And you know that elsewhere in Europe, it was the same. Terrorist groups have been arrested in the U.K., in Spain, in Italy, elsewhere. So for us, the main threat is clearly al Qaeda.

The second reason is that we don't see Iraq as an urgent threat. It doesn't mean that Iraq is not a threat, but is it an urgent threat. And the mood in Europe I would say is probably not an urgent threat. Why? Well, because the inspections have been quite successful and have destroyed more armaments between 1991 and 1998 than the Gulf War itself. So I don't say that Iraq is disarmed, but has been weakened by the war and the inspections because in a way, Saddam is in his box, and the box now is closed with the inspectors doing their job in the box.

So we consider that North Korea, in a way, could be considered as a greater threat, because they claim that they have the capacity to build nuclear bombs, and maybe they have one or two. They have missiles with long and medium range, and they export their technology to Pakistan, to Yemen, to other countries.

So, on Iraq, that's the mood. The threat exists, of course, but it's not urgent.

The third reason about the mood in Europe is about not the war itself but the consequences of the war.

The consequences of the war in Iraq, first:

Iraq is a very complex country -- we all know that -- with the Kurds, the Shi'a, the Sunni; with a number of tribes, a tradition of violence. And so to bring democracy to Iraq is a great ambition, and we support it, but it will not be an easy task.

The second consequence, possible consequence, of the war is in the region itself. The peace process in the Middle East is in a stalemate, and we don't see much action from all of us to give a boost to the peace process. And in that context, a war in Iraq could trigger more frustration, bitterness, in the Arab world and beyond, in the Muslim world.

And third, as a consequence of these two elements, we fear in Europe that a war could trigger more terrorism, more recruitment for al Qaeda. You may say, "Well, they already recruit." Yes, but if there is anger, bitterness, then you can expect more recruitment and -- by far.

So these are the reasons which explain why, in Europe, not only in France, the mood about the war is, to say the least, very cautious. We fear the consequences of such a war.

Now, upon this background, what is the position in France? And first, where are we in the Security Council?

First, I want to pay tribute to Secretary Powell, to his remarkable performance in the Security Council.

Secretary Powell is respected everywhere. We listened very carefully to his speech. We are studying all the elements that he has provided. We very much welcome the fact that he came to the Security Council to provide his evidence or elements, because that's where this demonstration had to take place.

We have, I would say, only element at that stage of -- I would say one question mark about the links between Baghdad and al Qaeda. I say that for France because, so far, we have not seen that evidence with all the elements from networks of al Qaeda that we have arrested and put in jail. When we had the possibility to ask them from their experience, their personal experience, they were trained in Afghanistan, maybe in Pakistan, they went to Bosnia from Algeria, most recently they went to Chechnya before coming to France. That is our experience. I don't want to go beyond. This is a question to be discussed between intelligence specialists, but I just put a question mark on that.

Now, as Richard said, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, Hans Blix and ElBaradei will be in Baghdad. They'll meet the leaders of that country, and of course they will have a long list of questions, the questions that they had in mind when Blix and ElBaradei presented their report on the 27th of January to the Security Council and, in addition to that, all the questions which emerged from Secretary Powell's speech.

We expect the Iraqis to respond clearly to all these questions. We demand the Iraqi government to provide clear and convincing answers on all issues on all these questions. Then the inspectors will come back to New York and prepare a new report, and it will be presented to the Security Council on the 14th, in a few days time.

And this will be a very important moment, because for us, the rule of the game is that it is for the inspectors to provide their assessment of the situation in terms of disarmament of Iraq, and then for the members of the council, all of them, to discuss the issue and eventually to take a decision.

What is the position of France in that context? And first, on what do we agree with the United States? Well, we agree on the nature of the regime in Baghdad. No doubt that we have in Baghdad for too many years a dictator who is a disaster for his own people and has been a threat for neighboring states. We all agree on that, I think.

Second, we agree on the goal that must be achieved: Disarmament of Iraq; if possible, peacefully through the U.N. inspections, and if not, we have the option of the use of force.

We agree also, I think, on the need to work within the Security Council. And for us, unity of the Security Council is key because what is at stake is the capacity of the world community to exert the strongest pressure on Baghdad to obtain results -- more cooperation, more active cooperation. So far, we got passive cooperation; it's not enough. We want active cooperation.

So then, on what do we disagree? We disagree on one issue which is important. I would say a question of timing. Is it time to go to war in few weeks time, or should we maintain, for the time being, the inspections? Clearly, we say let's have the inspections doing their job and, if need be, let's reinforce the inspectors. But remember that the inspectors are deployed -- have been deployed recently. They are working for only two months. But when I say two months, not with the full strength. They have better equipment than UNSCOM in the past, they are more numerous and we consider that they are good professionals doing a good job.

Now, if this is not enough in terms of capacities, then let's decide together in the Security Council to double, to triple the number of inspectors. Let's provide them with more capacities. We consider that the U-2 plane must be used. And I would say that it is not a question to be negotiated, it is an obligation for Iraq to accept the presence of the U-2 plane. And we have proposed officially to add to the U-2 plane Mirage plane for surveillance purposes as the U-2 plane, to complement the mission of the U-2 plane.

We have also proposed that there could be a specialized body for surveillance of the sites which may be of importance for the inspectors so that 24 hours a day there would be this surveillance to make sure that there would be no transfer of any material.

We propose also to open more regional offices to make sure that the inspectors would be nearer the different sites that they want to inspect, so that the time between the moment instruction is given to the inspectors and the moment they reach the place they want to inspect would be minimal.

We have also proposed to establish with the inspectors a list of all the unresolved issues in terms of disarmament to clarify the priorities and to set demanding but realistic time frame to solve all these issues.

And, of course, all this is well and good, but it will work only if Iraq cooperates actively. As I said, so far Iraq has cooperated better than in the past, in the '90s. You remember all these crises with the presidential palaces, the sensitive sites, and so on and so forth. This time there is no place where the inspectors are not allowed to go immediately. So the rule of the game is better. So far, the doors have been opened. But we expect and we demand more from Iraq.

We want them to produce evidence. We want them to show what they have. We want clear and convincing answers from Iraq.

Now, one last word before answering your questions. We consider that the Security Council, as I said, must remain united. Is it "mission impossible"? We don't think so. And from my experience in New York, I would say that when we started negotiating Resolution 1441, we were far away from our American friends. And after two months, eight weeks, of hard but professional negotiation, we adopted unanimously Resolution 1441. And we were unanimous because we did a good job, but also because France engaged herself in a number of demarches. The last one was with President Assad of Syria to get a "yes" vote from Syria, and it was important because Syria represent in the Security Council the Arab countries.

So my hope is that this time again, when we'll get the new report of the inspectors on the 14th, we'll assess the situation together through long discussion in the Security Council, and then we'll assess and decide if it is time to start preparing another resolution or if we should simply decide to give more times to the inspectors, with maybe more capacities, as I mentioned. So, so far, that's exactly where we are.

And I'm ready now to answer your questions.

John Salzberg with the United Nations Association, National Capital Area.

AMB. LEVITTE: On the no-fly zone, it is a question which is and must remain outside the scope of Resolution 1441. The no-fly zones were established after the Gulf War to protect the minorities, the Shi'ite minority in the south, the Kurdish minority in the north. And it's been decided during our discussions in the Security Council when we negotiated 1441 not to inject the no-fly zone as an element in the package. And the rule of the game is that the no-fly zone are now out of the game. The U.S. and U.K. planes continue their missions, and it doesn't create any problems for the inspections. You know that the inspectors have helicopters, but the rule of the game technically has been clarified and it's not a problem. And we don't see any element of bargaining between the U-2 and maybe the Mirage IV missions and the no-fly zone. These are two separate issues and they must remain separate.

Now, Article 51, all countries have the right to defend themselves when they feel that they are under an imminent threat, and they can do so either alone or with partners in a coalition. That's always an option.

And you remember that -- or you don't, maybe I should be more explicit about that -- when there was 9/11 the tragedies France was chairing the Security Council. I was the president of the Security Council. And when the doors of the U.N. building were reopened on the 12th of September, I proposed to my colleagues in the Security Council a resolution deciding that this international terrorist act was equivalent to an act of war, first. And it was in legal terms a breakthrough. It was the first time an act of terrorism was equivalent or -- that we decided that it was equivalent to an act of war. And second, because of Article 51, we decided that it was legitimate for the country under attack to respond with full force of army, not only against those who committed these acts but also against all states which equipped, trained, offered hospitality and financed the terrorist networks. And that was a second breakthrough. And on that basis we've established the Counterterrorism Committee and so on and so forth. So you see Article 51, even in the new circumstances of the al Qaeda network, is a possibility.

Now, for Iraq, together we decided to establish a rule for the game -- that is, 1441 -- and we consider that we have not yet exhausted all the possibilities offered by Resolution 1441.

Barry Schweid, Associated Press.

AMB. LEVITTE: First, what is at stake is very important, and not only about Iraq. What is at stake is the very credibility of the inspections regime as a tool at the disposal of the United Nations. If we together decide that despite all our efforts, the inspections regime failed, then we may weaken the inspections as a tool at the disposal of the United Nations. And let me just show through one example how disastrous it would be in our view.

Take North Korea. In North Korea the inspectors have been ousted. And if you decide that the inspections don't work, what are the options left for North Korea? To bomb? So we must be cautious about the inspectors and the inspections in general, because between words and war, between condemnation by beautiful words, from words and war, we have at the disposal of the U.N. only two tools: sanctions and inspections. And of course Iraq for so many years has been the most important issue on the agenda of the Security Council on both sanctions and inspections.

So when the time will come to decide what we do with inspections, we should think not only of Iraq but also more globally of what we want to achieve through the U.N. And let's be cautious about the inspections. And this is why with we've proposed to strengthen the inspections in Iraq before we decide to go to war.

Now, to give an answer to your question, sir, I would say let's wait for the report of the inspectors on the 14th, because the rule of the game set by the resolution, and very precisely, is that it's on the basis of reports by the inspectors that the 15 members of the Security Council together must debate and decide what is the appropriate way forward. And my understanding of the situation as of today is that there is a broad majority -- probably 10 or 11 members of the Security Council -- in favor of the inspections, in favor of more time given to the inspectors. We'll see on the 14th on the basis of the report of the inspectors where we are, what is the assessment of the cooperation of Iraq. And only then we'll decide between new weeks and months for the inspectors or the possibility to conclude that there is no possibility to go on with the inspections, because in the view of the inspectors themselves the inspectors have reached a dead end. So I don't want to anticipate on their report, but they will have a very important report to prepare, that's for sure.

AMB. LEVITTE: Two very important questions. First, I am glad you raised the first one, because yes it's true that the relation between the U.S. and France is from time and time quite sensitive. But most of the time we are side by side. Will it be the same thing in the next few weeks? Frankly I don't know. It's too early to say. But I would say simply from my experience in New York that it would be wonderful if we could be together and if the Security Council could remain united on such an important issue. Why? Well, in a way because of your second question. If the Security Council is united, then the consequences of what could follow would be the consequences of a collective decision by the international community as a whole and not by one country supported by members of a coalition. And it makes a big difference, especially for the Arab countries and the Muslim countries.

Second, for the trans-Atlantic relations and the EU. You have noted maybe that the EU has not one position. And my experience is that we are very successful to adopt one common position as the EU, when we don't have division with the United States. I'll take one example, the Balkan region. We are together, and during the two wars in the Balkans it's more the Europeans who wanted to go to war and asked at the time President Clinton to join, because we didn't want to have ethnic cleansing in Europe.

Now, slowly, Europe is taking over full responsibility for the Balkan region. We are in the lead with 85 percent of the troops. We are taking over Macedonia; next year probably Bosnia. We are united, and we are united with our American friends and partners.

When there is a split between one, two, three European members and the U.S., then there is a split within the EU. That's a fact. That's life. It will change slowly -- I hope -- but we have to work with that. And this is another good reason to try to build a consensus within the Security Council, because when we are split -- when the whole international community is split the only winner in my view is Saddam Hussein.

On the transatlantic relations, I would say my hope is that through the discussions in the Security Council we'll converge on one unanimous position, and then we'll be together. If it is impossible, my guess is that there will be a need for transatlantic cooperation and a U.N. role beyond the war, because reconstruction of Iraq will be a daunting task. It will be for years and years a very, very difficult task -- very costly and politically very difficult, and at that moment it will be even more necessary to stay together. So my hope is that we'll succeed in the next few weeks to build a consensus in the Security Council which would solve a number of our issues that you mentioned -- for the European Union, for the transatlantic relation. But even if we didn't succeed, then beyond the war there will be a need to bridge the different gaps and work together to help the Iraqi people. Thank you.

Dr. Michael (ph) from Iraq.

AMB. LEVITTE: Thank you very much, and I respect what you say, of course. On Saddam Hussein I said right at the beginning that we consider Saddam Hussein to be a bloody dictator and a disaster for his own people. And we know that he used chemical weapons in Hallabja, and we know what he's doing. Simply when we negotiated Resolution 1441 together we decided that the objective, the goal of international community, was the disarmament of Iraq. And that is exactly what we are trying to achieve now. If we can't do it, then we'll have to decide in the Security Council.

Now, on the Iraqi people, we all know how brilliant a civilization Iraq has been for more than 5,000 or 6,000 years, and we admire and respect the Iraqi people and civilization. But our assessment is that after so many years of dictatorship democracy will be -- maybe -- maybe I'm wrong -- could be, I would say, difficult to put in place in a few days or a few weeks. Maybe I am wrong. Maybe you are right.

Now, I respect also the Afghan people, and they went through an ordeal that we all know. They represent also an old civilization. And frankly in Afghanistan we are experiencing difficulties. We know, because we have 5,000 troops in Kabul. We work together with our American friends. And despite tremendous changes and success, we must recognize that the Taliban are now reinforcing themselves in the Pashtun region. So I just want to have a note of caution about the rosy scenario. Maybe you are right. And if you are right, wonderful -- wonderful, because all people have a legitimate right to get democracy and to live in peace. That is our credo. That is the values that we share with our European and American partners and many more people, and that's our hope for the Iraqi people. But the transformation from the situation as of today to a democratic system which would work smoothly may be a bit difficult, a bit difficult. That is my analysis. You are Iraqi, and you know better than me.

Thank you very much.

Elena Poptodorova, the ambassador of Bulgaria to Washington.

AMB. LEVITTE: Thank you, dear colleague. You have provided a wonderful explanation of our divisions. But I think that it's more a question of presentation than substance. In fact, we, as "old Europe," were not proposed to sign the declaration of the eight. If we had been proposed to sign this declaration, I think that maybe with one or two words we would have no difficulty to sign it. And what we regret is that the Greek presidency of the European Union was not in a position to play its role as presidency of the Union; that is, to propose to the 15 members and to the 25 members of the expanded European Union, to sign the declaration. Because basically what does it say? It says that the transatlantic relation is of paramount importance. And I think that I stressed right from the beginning how important the friendship and cooperation between the U .S. and France is for us. So it is not a matter of debate.

And on the solution that we want to bring to Iraq, I think that the text of this declaration by the eight doesn't pose any problem to us, because it's -- it underlines the need to work through the Security Council to obtain disarmament. So basically I don't see much difficulty.

So my recommendation to "new Europe" is: Let's work together through the Greek presidency -- not to give the impression we are divided when on substance I think we are not.

Arshad Mohammed of Reuters.

AMB. LEVITTE: Why a list? Because so far the inspectors have been deployed -- more than 100 of them -- more than during the time of UNSCOM, and they are carrying about 300 missions a month. But we think that now it's time on the basis of that experience of two months to assess precisely the situation, with in mind the elements provided by Secretary Powell, and discuss with the inspectors in the Security Council where are the main threats. Is it nuclear? Is it the missiles? Is it chemical and biological weapons, as we think? Let's agree on what are the main threats and the main goals. Then let's try to adopt a method to get the answers, the evidence, and, if possible, to destroy stocks.

Should we for that have a timetable? We are ready to discuss that. And we think that a reasonable timetable could be debated in the Security Council among the 15 members with the inspectors so that we would know how we would proceed, when we would come back together, because 1441 doesn't give any time limit. In fact, the next step should be on the 27th of March, the presentation of the program of work. So what we want is to have a pure understanding between members of the council on the way forward.

Can we expect more active cooperation from Iraq? That's what we demand. And if they don't understand that message, which has been sent loud and clear time and again, they they'll be in big trouble. It seems to me that the huge pressure that all of us are now exerting on the leadership in Baghdad should provide better cooperation. And we know that there was, for the first time, an interview without an official near the scientist. Is it better? Of course, yes. Is it enough? Of course, no. Of course, no. Each time the inspectors want an interview, they have to decide what is the way forward, what is the methodology that must be followed. And it's up to them, not to the scientist to decide if there can be or not the presence of an official.

So, just through this example, we want more active cooperation. We'll see on the 14th where we are, and we'll decide together what are the next steps.

Al Millikin, Washington Independent Writers.

AMB. LEVITTE: Well, we don't rule out the military option. I said it quoting my minister. I say it again. It is the last option. That is, we should, in our view, pursue inspections as long as the inspectors themselves consider that they can do a good job, a proper job. It means that it is for the inspectors to tell us if they've reached a dead end. If they have reached a dead end, then it will be for the Security Council, the 15 members, to decide what are the next steps. And we don't exclude the possibility to approve the use of force if the conclusion of the inspectors is that because of this dead end, the elements of material breach could be there, as decided by the Security Council.

So I don't want to think about option of participation or non- participation of France and the possible consequences of the use of anthrax and so on and so forth, because for the time being, we are not yet at that stage. And it's very difficult to anticipate on all the scenarios. You described the rosy scenario; you described the black scenario; we have gray scenario -- (laughter) -- a lot of options. But for the time being, let's focus on our common task, that is, the disarmament of Iraq, if possible, peacefully. That's why the inspectors are deployed. And if they come back to us on the 14th or later and say, "We are in a dead end," then the council will have to decide.

AMB. LEVITTE: I'm so glad that your raised this question -- (laughter) -- because it provides me the possibility to give you answers. You have to know that the oil-for-food program, which is the program bringing food, medicine, some equipments to the Iraqi people, is the only way to have trade with Iraq. And we are not the first partner. We are not the second partner. We are not the third partner of Iraq. Nor the fourth, nor the fifth. We are the 13th -- 1-3, 13th partners of Iraq. You can check the statistics of the U.N. I know them by heart. (Laughter.)

Second, oil. We buy 8 percent of Iraqi oil. The U.S. is buying -- the latest statistic to my knowledge -- 56 percent of Iraqi oil. I could go on like that. It's a question that I know well. Iraq is not an important partner for France. It doesn't mean that it is not an important partner for everybody in the future. But now, the only possibilities for trade are oil-for-food. There is no possibility to invest in the oil industry. This is forbidden -- no signature of contracts, and so on and so forth.

So the only statistics that you can have are the oil-for-food program -- we are the 13th partner -- and the export of oil, which is the only resource of Iraq today, and we buy 8 percent, and the U.S. buys 56 percent of the total oil exports of Iraq.

Thank you very much.