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IRAQ/UNITED NATIONS

French nonpaper on strengthening the inspections - Document circulated to UNMOVIC, the IAEA and members of the United Nations Security Council

New York, February 10, 2003

UNSCR 1441 (2002) states in the preamble that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and of the IAEA is essential for the implementation of UNSCR 687 and other relevant resolutions. In paragraph 7 it sets out a number of revised and additional rules to facilitate the inspectors’ work in Iraq. The present organization of UNMOVIC is based on the organizational plan submitted to the Security Council on 6 April 2000 by Hans Blix in accordance with paragraph 6 of UNSCR 1284 and approved by the Council in a letter from its president to the Secretary-General on 13 April 2000. The plan (S/2000/292) itself provides, in paragraph 3, for the possible revision of the Commission’s structure and personnel according to developments and future needs. The purpose of strengthening the regime is to increase the effectiveness of the inspections: they must be more intensive, more carefully targeted, more intrusive. Our approach is based on the need to compel Iraq to cooperate by taking the peaceful approach of intrusive inspections. To do this, it is necessary for the inspections to be fully completed, with the political, technical and material support of member States. The idea is to make sure that the present system submits the Iraqi authorities to constant pressure, and that they have no choice other than to "cooperate immediately, unconditionally and actively" with the inspectors as required under UNSCR 1441. The inspections were designed from the outset as a necessary intrusive instrument to ensure the elimination of banned Iraqi programmes. Their role has always been conceived as compelling the Iraqis to comply with their obligations.

1 : Proposals:

Increasing numbers and diversifying personnel:

The objectives are to widen the geographic coverage of the country by increasing the number of inspectors in various parts of the territory, intensify the inspections (increasing the number and frequency of inspections), make them more intrusive, and lastly enable the inspectors to deal with sites that are widely spread out. This would enhance the effectiveness of the inspections in terms of disarmament and containment. Such measures would make it much more difficult for Iraq to attempt any concealment.

There are today about 110 UNMOVIC inspectors and nine IAEA inspectors in Iraq. On average, ten teams are in the field every day. So far, barely half the designated sites have been inspected. If the number of inspectors is doubled (240) or tripled (360), then the number of daily inspections is also doubled or tripled.
Aside from doubling or tripling the number of inspectors and inspections teams in the areas of expertise covered at the moment (chemical, biological, ballistic and nuclear weapons), other types of personnel and experts should be recruited:

The security unit set up to protect the inspectors’ facilities could be significantly reinforced so that it can ensure the monitoring of certain suspicious sites or already inspected sites in cases where UNMOVIC and the IAEA believe it necessary. Such personnel could also intervene in the framework of the UNSCR 1441 provision which stipulates that the inspectors are authorized to freeze activity at a site, at least at the most extensive sites.

To probe still further, UNMOVIC and the IAEA need not only arms experts but also experts in customs and accounting, archivists and other experts who can help improve their understanding of the nature of Iraqi proliferation programmes on the basis of administrative, budgetary, financial and customs documents and archives, etc. An understanding of these aspects of the Iraqi programmes could allow UNMOVIC and the IAEA to proceed with more intrusive missions, including in archive centres.

Administrative and technical support personnel and translators/interpreters to and from Arabic should be increased proportionately.

Mobile customs teams should be established to check the nature of goods entering Iraq and make sure there are no prohibited goods (military equipment barred under UNSCR 687 and dual-use goods included on the GRL and not approved by the 661 committee). Convoys would not be stopped systematically, but UNMOVIC could inspect cargoes at will.

UNMOVIC has a regional office in Mosul and will soon have one in Basra. Given the geographic distribution of the sites to be inspected, these two regional offices should be able to cover the country well enough. An office in the west of the country could nevertheless be useful, particularly to serve as a base for the above-mentioned mobile customs units.

Strengthening technical resources:

Aerial surveillance in particular must be increased. This would make it possible to conduct systematic sweeps over Iraqi territory and permanently monitor all the sites. Above all, the specific characteristics of each type of aircraft would make it possible to prepare and accompany inspections. This would enable UNMOVIC to promptly identify sites at which movements or changes have allegedly been detected, and to send an inspection team immediately. Aerial reconnaissance would also ensure that once the inspectors have left a site it remains "frozen." Surveillance at that frequency would reveal any possible efforts at concealment.

The aim would be also to facilitate the collection and processing of data from national intelligence services. UNMOVIC and IAEA officials responsible for collecting such data could be mandated by Mr Blix and Dr ElBaradei to establish a joint centre or bureau, organically attached to both UNMOVIC and the IAEA. The bureau could be located in New York (or Vienna). It would be authorized to request, receive and process data from (1) national intelligence services and (2) information collected by UNMOVIC’s own aerial reconnaissance aircraft. The structure should be kept relatively light, made up of five to ten high-level experts, especially photo-analysts. At the same time, the services of member States would be urged to cooperate more closely among themselves and systematically send their data to the UNMOVIC and IAEA coordination centre.

Enhancing methods:

The objective is to have UNMOVIC and the IAEA draw up the complete list of unresolved disarmament questions in order of importance. The idea is to have a clear, precise and objective picture of the problems that still have to be dealt with. This involves not only identifying completely all the remaining outstanding issues, but also evaluating their importance and degree of priority. It is important to get the Iraqis up against a wall and not leave them any way out regarding the questions which they must answer and on which genuinely active cooperation is expected. Such an exercise could also be useful for evaluating the nature of the threat Iraq represents.

The inspections should be organized and planned so as to move forward systematically in elucidating each of the outstanding questions. An order of priority should to be established, along with a time-frame. A progress report, or assessment of the lack of progress, in various identified areas should be made at regular intervals. Placing a permanent coordinator in Iraq:

Mr Blix and Dr ElBaradei are not called upon to remain in Iraq all the time. It would be particularly useful for them to have someone in Baghdad who would act as their representative and at the same time serve as an interlocutor with the Iraqi authorities on a day-to-day basis. Such a representative would also coordinate UNMOVIC and IAEA activities on the spot. On a daily basis he would synthesize the questions and problems and liaise with the Iraqi authorities. He would be responsible for synthesizing the interim progress reports on each question at regular intervals.

2. Implementation:

Our intention is to implement these proposals in close liaison with UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Naturally, it would in priority be for Mr Blix and Dr ElBaradei to decide on the modes of application of these various proposals. UNMOVIC and the IAEA have sufficient funding to strengthen the inspections mechanism as envisaged. UNMOVIC has accumulated resources from the two and half years it was in existence before the inspectors returned to Iraq, and during that period its expenditure was far less than its resources. The Commission’s account continues to be regularly funded as Iraq continues to export oil (0.8% of oil receipts paid into an escrow account).

With regard to personnel, the UNMOVIC roster lists about 350 experts, including the 110 inspectors already there. Rotations are currently planned every three months. Accordingly, it is possible to double the inspection staff immediately by extending the length of stay and immediately mobilizing the rest of the experts on the list. The numbers could be tripled quickly since experts could be selected and trained swiftly. Training sessions, in groups of 60, last from three to five weeks.

Regarding technical resources, several countries have announced they are ready to provide immediately additional surveillance aircraft. In addition to the U2s, the following could be made available: Russian Antonovs, French Mirage IVs and German UAVs.

ANNEX

Excerpts from the French Foreign Minister’s speech to the Security Council, 5 February 2003

"[To strengthen the inspections regime], we must define with Mr Blix and Dr ElBaradei the requisite tools for increasing their operational capabilities:

let us double or triple the number of inspectors and open up new regional offices. Let us go further: could we not establish a specialized body to keep under surveillance the sites and areas already inspected?

let us substantially increase the capabilities for monitoring and collecting information on Iraqi territory. Here, France is ready to provide full support; she is ready to deploy Mirage IV reconnaissance aircraft;

let us collectively establish a coordination and data-processing centre that would supply Mr Blix and Dr ElBaradei, in real time and in a coordinated way, with all the intelligence resources they might need;

let us list the unresolved disarmament questions and rank them by importance;

with the consent of the leaders of the inspections teams, let us define a demanding and realistic time-frame for moving forward in the assessment and elimination of the problems. We must regularly keep track of the progress made in Iraq’s disarmament.

This enhanced regime of inspections and surveillance could be usefully complemented by having a permanent UN coordinator for Iraq’s disarmament, stationed over there and working under the authority of Mr Blix and Dr El Baradei."./.

Embassy of France in the United States - February 10, 2003