Today's Date:

Is the development of European defence the biggest threat ever to the Atlantic alliance, as some have recently suggested?

This is not the first time progress towards European defence has been presented as a danger to NATO. Remember June 1996? That was when, following a proposal by France, Britain and Germany, NATO decided that the Europeans could, when acting collectively, use NATO assets for military operations. Or December 1998? Then, thanks to an initiative by Tony Blair, Britain's prime minister, France and Britain, with the backing of Germany, took a decisive step at the St-Malo summit: they concluded that the European Union "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises". It was agreed that the EU should be able to act, whether using NATO assets or its own, "outside the NATO framework".

Today the question being debated is a simple one: when conducting autonomous operations outside the NATO framework, would it not make sense for the EU to be able to rely on its own autonomous capabilities to plan and conduct such operations? This is what France and Germany, with Belgium and Luxembourg, proposed at their 29 April summit. It was discussed at the Berlin meeting between Mr Blair, President Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder on 20 September. In 1996 and 1998, events followed the same pattern: an agreement between France, Germany and Britain developed into an EU-wide consensus; and Washington sternly warned the three countries that they were jeopardising the very existence of the Atlantic alliance. Today, an EU consensus remains our goal; and the reaction from Washington has been much the same.

But what followed the 1996 and 1998 initiatives was not NATO's demise but its revitalisation. After 1996, NATO made a success of its first big peacekeeping operation in the Balkans, began a new relationship with Russia and forged closer links with the wider Europe. After 1998, NATO fought a successful campaign in Kosovo and welcomed new members. Today, efforts to provide European defence with new autonomous capabilities coincide with the birth of a NATO Rapid Reaction Force.

From all this, it is clear that there is no question of an "EU army" (nor, for that matter, a NATO army). What we have is a shared will among European countries to put their capabilities at the EU's disposal whenever necessary so that it can fulfil its international responsibilities and defend its interests. The aim is not to compete with NATO but to make the EU a serious, respected partner internationally. European defence is the best way to give the lie to the theories of those who want to condemn Europe to be forever weak. The biggest threat to the alliance is not the progress of European defence or, more generally, a strong, united Europe. What would really threaten its future would be a weak, divided Europe, abdicating its responsibilities.

The alliance rests on trust. NATO has survived the disappearance of the main cause for its creation – the Soviet threat – precisely because of a shared commitment on both sides of the Atlantic to maintain a strong link. None of the Europeans wants to jettison this commitment. They said as much by invoking, for the first time in NATO’s history, the Treaty's mutual defence clause in support of the US after it was attacked on 11 September 2001. All Europeans continue to see NATO as the foundation of our collective defence.

The tragedy of 11 September and the common threats that we all face should spur us to mobilise the vast reserves of solidarity between the two shores of the Atlantic and to build, at last, the enduring and balanced relationship between the US and Europe for which we have been striving for 50 years.

European defence will progress because it is a necessity for everyone who wants a strong Europe and a lasting alliance. All the allies should be able to rally round this objective.

In his book “The Troubled Partnership”, Henry Kissinger wrote: “What is needed is a recognition that it is in the long-term interest of the United States to share responsibilities even more than burdens... The assertions of European self-will which we find so irritating today can be the growing pains of a new and healthier relationship which ultimately is important for us as well.” This was written 38 years ago. It is still valid./.