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EUROPEAN DEFENSE

Symposium on transatlantic relations organized by the Institut des relations internationales stratégiques (IRIS) – Speech by Michèle Alliot-Marie, Minister of Defense (excerpts)

Paris, May 6, 2003

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The subject of your meeting this year is an extraordinarily burning one.

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I won’t dispute the obvious need to redefine the transatlantic relationship. But it doesn’t date from the Iraq crisis. (...) As for France, her policy and aim is to preserve the Alliance by revamping it.

1) Present situation

Ever since the disappearance of the threat which had led to its emergence, many people have predicted the end of the Alliance. To my mind, it’s more a case of it going through a series of identity crises which make changes inescapable.

1.1 – What role is there for NATO in Europe?

The first of these crises occurred, of course, in 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the disappearance of the USSR as a strategic adversary. In the end, this first reassessment of NATO’s function resulted in a pragmatic solution, with us moving from a system of two opposing coalitions to one of collective security. The political significance of the integration of most of the former Warsaw Pact countries into the Alliance is, in this respect, as important as the resulting additional military capabilities.

1.2 – 11 September and its consequences

The 11 September terrorist attacks were another test for NATO. This is paradoxical since for the first time the Allies invoked Article 5 to help one of their own, thus publicly displaying their solidarity. But the fact that the United States was the beneficiary perhaps slightly distorted the spirit of the Alliance. There was the feeling that she was using NATO as a toolbox.

1.3 – Iraq crisis

The fundamental differences which erupted during the Iraq crisis within Europe and between Europe and the United States are too well-known for me to go over them again. I want, however, to affirm my total conviction that the democracies can’t go on for long arguing over the issue of respect for the law. It is the main strength of our systems.

2) Reasons for optimism

2.1 – Nearing the end of the crisis?

Nevertheless, there are increasing signs that the worst of the crisis is behind us. Admittedly, it’s difficult to determine when the wounds which have been opened up will really heal. I’m thinking in particular of the damage done to Franco-American relations in the minds of the general public.
But the politicians themselves are pragmatists. Everyone in the US Administration does not think exactly the same way. Many within it are keen not to blow up the dispute out of proportion.
So I firmly believe that the river will end up returning to its natural course. There are some signs that our friendly relationship could be restored at the Evian Summit.

2.2 – Complementarity of the two continents

More fundamentally, the North Atlantic's two shores have ties of solidarity because they are complementary and are indissolubly linked. We obviously share the same democratic values, i.e., above all, respect for the law in relations between people and between communities. Our interests are inextricably linked. Transatlantic economic and technological interdependence naturally generates solidarity.
For example, in a speech at Harvard, Javier Solana recently pointed out that European investment in the State of Texas exceeded US investment in Japan. That puts into perspective theories that the world's centre of gravity is moving towards the Pacific.
A community of threats naturally springs from this community of interests. We have the same dependence and the same constraints in the fields of energy and commodities. Terrorism struck our countries and their citizens well before the 11 September terrorist attacks. Let me remind you that France was immediately four square behind the United States in the fight against al-Qaida. She remains so. We must together fight terrorism. But we must be careful to fight not only its manifestations, but also its causes. The major strengths which the United States and Europe have to bring to bear in the fight against bad governance and the effort to bring peace in the Middle East are complementary.
So we must strengthen and reform the transatlantic relationship to tailor it to these new threats. This is the proactive task France is intent on proposing.

3) The French vision

We are determined to revamp the transatlantic relationship in order to safeguard it.

3.1 – Tailoring NATO to the challenges of the contemporary world

Let no one get it wrong: for France, NATO remains at the heart of Europe's and thus our country's defence system.
But the Alliance has to be tailored to the challenges of the contemporary world, which are radically different from those obtaining at the time of its creation. It must take account of the changes in the nature of the threats: we support and back the NATO Response Force.
It must take account of the emergence of a European Union called on to play its role and shoulder its responsibilities on its own continent. Growing use is being made of the ESDP and not just at treaty level. The EU has already taken over from NATO in Macedonia. It is getting ready to do so in Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO isn’t being evicted, since these operations are taking, or will take place with NATO's support. Nevertheless we must not rule out eventually mounting operations autonomously, as and when our capabilities become stronger.
We must also take into consideration the fact that the US priorities are focusing, insofar as our continent is to a large extent becoming secure, on other parts of the world.

Revamping the alliance also means rethinking the relations uniting its members. I'm thinking in the first place of the States which joined it recently. They must be helped to play their full role as partners, which, frankly, is only marginally possible at the moment because of the current state of their armed forces. This requires, of course, not just bringing their equipment up to standard, but also a real acculturation. For this to be fully accepted, relations within the Alliance have to be based on respect for every member, for any differences between them and on trust. For the allies to act as allies they must be treated as such. Our diversity is the source of our wealth; we must use it.

3.2 – Getting the Europeans to take responsibility

Concurrently, it is for the Europeans to prove, in the first place to our American friends, that they are ready to acquire the capabilities they need to defend themselves. When it comes to transatlantic relations, people have been harping on for a long time about the need for burden-sharing. The changing nature of the threats now puts this within our reach.

Today, only three European countries devote anything like 2% of their GDP to defence: France, Britain and Greece. It is highly desirable for other nations to make a similar effort. More account would be taken of their positions. France now, as you know, is showing an example in this sphere, as I never miss an opportunity of reminding my European colleagues. This could only benefit the European defence industry, which is making an essential contribution to keeping us up in the technology race.

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A multipolar world is being rebuilt. The transatlantic link will continue to play a determining role in it. The Europeans are developing a centre of power which will remain the special partner of the American one. (...)./.

Embassy of France in the United States - May 13, 2003