Today's Date:

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Relations between the U.S. and Europe are regularly jolted by one thing or another, and the peaks and troughs make the relationship seem a bit impassioned sometimes. The rule also holds good for the Bush Administration. After a difficult start marked by the announcement that the U.S. was withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol, the transatlantic partnership undeniably warmed in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The State of the Union speech rekindled controversy which was exacerbated in an altogether different register by President Bush’s decision on steel. Some people went so far as to claim that transatlantic relations were stretched to the point of no return, that they were losing their core character both for the U.S. which was focused on other regions, Russia and Asia, and for Europe preoccupied by its own internal debates (enlargement and institutional reform).

Personally, I am convinced that the special relationship remains unequaled. The 9/11 attacks do not challenge the basic givens of the transatlantic relationship. Quite the contrary. The attacks have, however, had the effect of amplifying what we have in common and exacerbating our differences. The result is that we find ourselves in something of a paradox today : We have never been so close, yet we have rarely risked so much in opposing each other. I’d like us to take a look at the reasons for this schizophrenia and what we can do to remedy its most harmful effects.

1/ The transatlantic relationship is unprecedented and unique.

One characteristic of the transatlantic relationship is so obvious that one hardly bothers to mention it. That characteristic, however, is an essential one. It underlies the special ties that bind the United States and Europe : we share common values, common security and common interests.

1/ The United States and Europe share the same political philosophy. It can be summed up by a few basic notions: the rule of law, democracy, the protection of minorities, the market economy. That cultural proximity is rooted in Enlightenment philosophy. Thus we share two centuries of common history. Those democratic ideals are nevertheless as fragile as they are invaluable. The attacks of September 11 showed that the principles of freedom are not shared by everyone and must be defended, by force if necessary. On this dramatic occasion, Europe manifested its unconditional solidarity with the United States. The transatlantic relationship is also, and above all, this unanimous and spontaneous defense of a few essential values.

2/ The United States and Europe share security for their territories and their populations. In this regard, proliferation of WMD is a common concern. NATO is the most striking expression of our military ties. The Treaty of Washington underlies the only defensive alliance ever agreed to by the United States in peacetime. In this area too, the attacks of September 11 underscored the closeness of the transatlantic relationship with Article 5 invoked for the very first time. I would add that the attacks of September 11 also demonstrated that security is not exclusively military. The fight against terrorism demands reinforced cooperation in the financial sphere, in intelligence-sharing and more broadly, in the judicial and police fields. From this point of view, transatlantic relations are exceptionally dense.

3/ The United States and Europe also share the same economic interests. Indeed, we have achieved such a high degree of interdependence that any kind of trade war would be virtually suicidal. Some 550 billion dollars’ worth of goods and services crossed the Atlantic in 2000. Crossed investments amount to some $1400 billion. Our interests should of course encourage us to overcome disputes that represent a mere 2 to 3 percent of total bilateral trade. To sum up, we are at the same time competitors, but mostly partners. Moreover, the United States and the European Union alone represent 40 percent of the world’s GDP. The weight of those two trading partners implies special responsibilities in the international commercial system. The Seattle Conference was a failure, due to the lack of a transatlantic agreement. The Doha Conference was a success because Americans and Europeans first agreed upon the main points of a new round of negotiations.

Obvious as it may seem, this special relationship between the two shores of the Atlantic should not be taken for granted. It deserves attention. It must be nurtured by common undertakings. It can grow only through regular meetings at every level and in every area. It must naturally integrate different analyses and find ways to calmly settle disputes.

II/ Differences and disputes must be dealt with serenety.

I would identify three types of disputes, in the broad sense, by growing order of difficulty : The first are of a commercial nature, the second relate to societal issues and the third involve diplomatic and political questions.

1/ I will mention only two commercial problems, the ones that are in my view the most important and the most urgent. With regard to Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC), the decisions handed down by the WTO panels require a profound change in American fiscal regulations. Recent congressional hearings showed that the Bush Administration was fully conscious of its obligations. Congress, however, seems to be more divided and more hesitant. Europeans, through Commissioner Lamy, expressed their determination to see their rights prevail, by retaliation if necessary. Certainly, the American election calendar is not favorable to the adoption of a large-scale tax reform this year. But the United States must guarantee that it will make a good-faith effort to rapidly comply with the WTO rules.

A word on steel. President Bush’s decision to increase customs duties up to 30% on certain steel products is unacceptable. As much for us as it is for other European countries, Russia, Japan and Brazil. It is unacceptable for several reasons: it is in violation of WTO rules; it casts discredit on U.S. commitments to free trade; it is discriminatory; it was obviously taken for strictly domestic political considerations; it doesn’t solve the real difficulties certain U.S. steel producers are facing; it could depress the American and international economy; lastly, it exposes the U.S. to retaliatory measures. France has been hit hard by these measures even though it had accepted painful restructuring in its own steel industry. We fully support the action of Commissioner Lamy both in regard to the European measures that have been decided on to protect the European market and the request for compensation that has been sent to the American authorities. We must avoid all escalation and a solution that is in compliance with WTO rules.

2/ I will also limit myself to two societal issues : the environment and biotechnologies. The announcement of the American withdrawal from the Kyoto Agreement was the first snag in the transatlantic relationship under the Bush Administration. The measures announced by the United States to limit greenhouse gas emissions seem, at first glance, far below the commitments made by Kyoto Agreement Member States. They are voluntary, non-binding measures. They should not help reduce emissions. The European states remain convinced that global warming is a major issue for future generations. As such, it requires governments to take drastic and politically difficult measures because they challenge, in part, our way of life and our consumer culture. Yet they are necessary if we are to avoid an irreversible degradation of our environment.

Biotechnologies : This is a very complex case in which the trade issues are compounded by technological, cultural and political issues. France, like many European countries, is particularly sensitive to food safety and in a more general way to public health. The “mad cow” crisis and then foot-and-mouth disease hurt farming interests badly and have had a lasting effect on consumer habits. Consequently, there will be no short-cuts in the debate over the principle of precaution, especially in the case of GMOs. What’s taking place here is not knee-jerk protectionism, as some people would like to think, but genuine apprehension in the minds of the public about the long-term consequences of consuming such products. These concerns also have political overtones, especially in France ; some movements have already made these issues their rallying cry. So we have to give ourselves time to consider all the aspects, refrain from making hasty judgments and avoid caricaturing the positions of our partners.

In a general way, I believe that there is where we come up against profound differences in culture and ideology that it would be dangerous to reduce solely to their trade dimensions. In a nutshell, while the U.S. is pleading for free market and individual initiative, Europe remains committed to the regulatory function of government and to our concept of solidarity, reluctant to accept any exposure to risk (that’s the underlying reason for the famous “principle of precaution”). This difference in attitude, which goes to the core of our mindsets, culture and history, must be accepted in all its complexity, and we must resist the temptation to cast all the blame one way, resulting in atavistic protectionism for some, and unbridled free trade for the others.

3/ A few remarks to conclude on some of our political and diplomatic differences. These have become more shrill with the now famous “axis of evil” expression used by President Bush in his State of the Union speech. Beyond these words European reactions betrayed a real concern that the United States would give in to the unilateralist temptations naturally made possible by its military superiority. These reactions expressed also as a real desire to air different readings of certain international crises. That is the case with the Mideast which is naturally our main subject of concern, not only because the situation is tragic, but also because clashes between Israelis and Palestinians are endangering regional stability, and their effects are being felt as far away as France.

In this regard, I want to say in no uncertain terms that recent anti-jewish incidents in France are absolutely intolerable and must be duly punished. Our President and Prime Minister have condemned them in the strongest possible language and have taken strong police measures. As for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, our analyses of its causes and our proposals for resolving it differ significantly from those of the United States. We believe that the situation cannot be analyzed through the exclusive prism of the fight against terrorism. For quite some time now, the French authorities have been calling on the United States to re-commit itself in the Middle East in order to promote a peace plan acceptable to both parties, to walk a more balanced line between Mr. Sharon and Mr. Arafat, and to transcend a strictly security-based reading of the situation.

From this standpoint, President Bush’s recent speech marks a turning point. His warning to the two parties is clear : No one can hope to impose his views by force. The decision to send Mr. Powell to the Mideast demonstrates America’s will to find a solution to a “bloody impasse”. Security Council resolution 1402, the Tenett-Mitchell plan and Prince Abdullah’s proposals lay down the outlines of a solution. Together we must strive to stop the endless spiral of violence and allow the Israelis and Palestinians to finally live in peace. France for its part will spare no effort in the quest for a just and lasting peace.

Are these differing assessments harmful to the transatlantic relationship? No, not if we don’t let them degenerate. To the contrary, they are natural (the United States’ European allies are happy to be supportive but not obedient). There always will be differences between us. Perhaps there will be even more of them as the European Union asserts itself politically and militarily. But that evolution shouldn’t be overdramatized.

III/ Transatlantic relations can be further improved.

Europeans must strive to explain their positions, and Americans must strive to listen to them. Differences must not be underestimated or even ignored. They must be calmly explained and discussed. We should work harder to eliminate misunderstandings. There are three things we could do.

1/ We should place more stress on the things that bring us together rather than on those that divide us, and continually recall the essential values that underlie our privileged relationship.

The fundamental nature of the transatlantic relationship must certainly be recalled on a regular basis. The European project is not directed against the United States. To the contrary, certain important foreign policy issues, such as the Balkans, reveal the complementarity of our efforts (think Macedonia and Bosnia, for example). Europe’s defense policy, as we conceive it, is not to duplicate or to weaken NATO, but to create the conditions for burden-sharing and the sharing of responsibilities. The Euro is an element of stability and simplification whose scope and interest has already been grasped by U.S. economic players. EU enlargement will enhance the continent’s security and prosperity. In exchange, we expect the United States to be as strongly committed as we are to multilateral bodies in general, and to the transatlantic relationship in particular. That’s in the clear interest of us all.

2/ We should continually reassert our desire for dialogue and coordination. As special as it is, our relationship should never be taken for granted. It deserves attention. It should be nurtured by joint projects. It can grow only through regular meetings at every level and in every area and genuine consultation on issues of common concern. From this standpoint, President Bush’s visit to Europe (including Paris) in May seems particularly welcome. His visit should help dissipate the malaise generated in Europe by the feeling now prevalent that the US, at the peak of their power, are tempted to go it alone, to act unilaterally. We are ready to help share burdens and share responsibilities. But we can do that only if we are consulted and involved in the decision-making process. Together there is nothing we cannot achieve. Separately, we are vulnerable to bitter failures. The objective is to move from “leadership in partnership to partnership in leadership.”

3/ We mustn’t overdramatize our differences. I believe they are inevitable, if not salutary, and should always be kept in perspective. They enable us to communicate frankly about difficult subjects. But it’s in everyone’s clear interest not to let them degenerate. Multilateral organizations (and first and foremost, the WTO and the UN) offer the appropriate context for ironing out our disputes and defining common approaches.

The transatlantic partnership offers additional opportunities for discussion. Since its beginnings in 1990 and especially since the Madrid Agenda was adopted in 1995, the transatlantic dialogue has helped organize relations between the U.S. and Europe. It has provided structures for consultation, for periodic meetings at all levels, and lastly an agenda covering a wide field ranging from foreign policy questions to trade issues.

Yet it seems that the actual results have not lived up to expectations. The way the transatlantic partnership functions is cumbersome, and the accumulation of structures for dialogue ends up overshadowing the dialogue itself (form ends up prevailing over substance in a way). The agenda items are both too disparate and poorly arranged in spite of repeated efforts to rationalize them. Trade issues, and especially trade disputes, obscure all the rest.

I think it is high time to renew the transatlantic dialogue. We could restructure it by focusing on three main lines : broaden the field of our consultations (by way of example, the recent emphasis on judicial and police cooperation – JHA - is a trend that deserves note and should be pursued) ; aim for concrete, operational results, not statements of intent (all too often the vacuity of some transatlantic meetings causes the partnership to lose credibility) ; and thirdly, clearly divide the roles among various bodies : in particular, we should drop from summit agendas many day-to-day operational issues that bog them down and instead give a more resolute political cast to important issues of the moment.

The transatlantic dialogue has been around for ten years and it needn’t be revamped from top to bottom because it has proven its utility ; but it needs to be re-energized so as to conserve the privileged character of the links between Europe and the U.S.

Conclusion

“ We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of currency and commodities, and developing coordinated policies in all other economic, diplomatic and political areas ”.

This statement was not made by a European official. It was made on July 4, 1962, by President Kennedy, in Philadelphia. It is more relevant than ever and nicely sums up France’s attitude toward the transatlantic relationship. Indeed, President Kennedy concluded : “ We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we could deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome task of building ”./.