Today's Date:

Following what I hope will soon become an established tradition, I was more than happy to accept your kind invitation to discuss security and defense prospects and projects in Europe today, as I had done with the class of 2000. The timing is just right, since we are just a month after the Nice European Council, where essential decisions were taken in the field of security and defense policy, and but a few days into the new administration, with which we expect to have a robust, and deep dialogue and cooperation on these issues.

Europe's projects are, as you know, based largely on long-established ideas, but the momentum that has been taken for the past year or two is such that the picture might appear blurred to an outside observer – as indeed it does to some of us on the inside. It is all the more important to take a step back and consider what we have achieved, what it is we want and where we are going on security and defense policy issues. I would also like to take a moment to open other perspectives for our discussion, by addressing security issues in a wider sense: arms control, non-proliferation and the news-catching issue of missile defense.

Shaping Europe's strategic environment

What kind of policies should Europe undertake in the 2000-2005 period to face the problems and challenges that we can envisage some ten or twenty years down the road? I would argue that we need a continuation of past policies as far as deepening and enlargement of the EU is concerned, while aggressively pursuing our more recent objectives in the field of security and defense policy.

I. E.U. Enlargement and Integration as a stabilizing force on the continent and on the international scene

The E.U. is both an indirect provider of security through stability (enlargement) and a direct provider of security (Common Foreign and Security Policy).

To face its challenges, Europe has more tools than military organizations. Of course NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defense. However, for crisis management, and especially the type of hybrid crisis that we are increasingly likely to encounter in the future, it is fair to say that the EU, because it is a political, economic and now military body, will be better equipped to provide all instruments of statecraft to shape its environment in a stabilizing way in order to avert crises, and to respond to them when a preventive strategy fails. What contribution can the EU bring to European stability? What shape should it have to fulfill its mission? Security is not only achieved through military means.

The EU's enlargement is a sign of its success. Since 1957, the EU has steadily absorbed new members, going from the original six to today's 15 over the years. The end of the Cold War spawned a wave of new candidates, this time coming from the former satellites of the USSR. It is fair to say that security is not the first objective of European enlargement. It is however more than just a by-product.

Looking for example toward the Balkans, we know that the only way to avoid a repetition of the terrible wars that have ravaged that region in the last decade is to integrate it, slowly but surely, into the European mainstream, both in economic and political terms. Our common objective, with the United States, is to reinforce the economies and the civil societies of these countries in such a way that their joining the European Union at least become a realistic perspective in the coming decade. The EU – Balkan Summit held in Zagreb last November helped illustrate this point, all the more so insofar as President Kostunica's participation illustrated the turn that Serbia has taken toward democracy, thanks in great part to the EU's firm hand at the helm during the last months of the Milosevic regime.

At the same time that is has enlarged, the European Union has deepened. One of the areas of integration that was not initially spelled out in the Treaty of Rome, Europe’s founding charter, is foreign policy. The European Union has, for the last thirty years, painstakingly undertaken to build up a common foreign policy.

Its achievements are perhaps disappointing when compared to the economic and commercial weight of the European Union. They are, however, far from insignificant especially if one considers the fact that CFSP per se is less than ten years old (Maastricht Treaty).

The debate has focused on the EU's military capabilities, an issue that I will address a little later on. We must not forget however that the EU also has at its disposal non-military crisis management capabilities, which it brought to bear for example during the Kosovo crisis and, more generally, in the Balkans. Resources and experience already exist in the fields of civilian policing, humanitarian assistance, electoral and human rights monitoring, mine clearance, rehabilitation and reconstruction... The list is long, but suffice it to say that the EU has at its disposal a very wide range of instruments in order to shape its environment and respond to crises. The current Swedish presidency of the European union has placed a great deal of emphasis on civilian crisis management capabilities.

II. European Security and Defense Policy

Few European issues have gotten so much attention in such a short time frame, especially in the U.S.. Just a little over two years separate us from the Anglo-French Saint Malo Summit, yet it is fair to say that we have covered more ground in these two years than over the last twenty. After the Nice European Council, I would like to catch my breath with you and to step back for a moment. What is this about, what is it we want, and where are we going?

A. What is this about? To quote Lord Robertson, "ESDP is about three things : capabilities, capabilities and capabilities". The French government wholeheartedly subscribes to this assertion, for at least two reasons : first of all, like the UK, France has always prided itself, on a national level, with a strong commitment to robust defense capabilities, and our present forces are there to show it - it is only natural that we attempt to pursue our European endeavor with the same priority. Second, because capabilities are the key to the success of ESDP, in terms of political credibility of course but also in terms of our military objectives.

1. - Let me tell you what our accomplishments and projects are in terms of capabilities :

As you all know by now, at Helsinki, a little over a year ago, the fifteen heads of State or Government set themselves two series of targets in terms of military capabilities. On the one hand, the quantitative so called "head-line goal" (60,000 troops rapidly deployable, self-sufficient for a whole year with the necessary air and naval support) and on the other hand qualitative targets regarding collective capabilities in areas such as command and control, intelligence and strategic transport.

An analysis of the pledges made by the Fifteen at the Capabilities Commitment Conference held during the French presidency last November 20 in Brussels confirms that by 2003, in keeping with the headline goal established in Helsinki, the European Union will be able to carry out the full range of the so-called Petersberg tasks (peace-keeping and peace-making), even though certain capabilities need to be improved both in quantitative and qualitative terms in order to maximize the capabilities available to the Union for high-end Petersberg tasks, especially if these are carried out without recourse to NATO assets.

In quantitative terms, the voluntary contributions announced by Member States last November make it possible to achieve in full the headline goal established in Helsinki since their contributions constitute a pool of more than 100,000 troops, approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 ships. additional commitments that we welcomed were made by non-EU partners, including allies such as Poland or Turkey.

France committed approximately 20% of the force, i.e. 12,000 men, 75 combat aircraft, and 12 vessels including its nuclear aircraft carrier. Moving from forces to key capabilities and especially c³I, France's contribution is comparatively the strongest in this field. It holds at the disposal of the EU its strategic and operational headquarters, as well as projectable tactical-level headquarters and communications systems, including secure satellite communications. In the field of intelligence, France is offering to the EU force access to satellite imagery through the helios satellite, as well as theater reconnaissance tools such as the mirage IV-P and the helicopter-based horizon sigint systems, both of which were extensively called upon during operation "allied force". As far as lift is concerned, France has made a substantial contribution to the force, in the form of some 30 medium and long range air-air refueling and transport aircraft, as well as two large-scale amphibious transports. All of these means meet the Helsinki criteria (deployable in 60 days, sustainable for a year) with the only exception of the carrier, that can stay on station for six months at a time.

Our commitments do not stop there however, and contrary to what I sometimes hear in Washington about ESDP being just a window-dressing exercise, many adaptation and procurement efforts are underway. These projects, both national and multinational, will contribute to the rapid reaction force. Let me share just a few of them that France is involved in: as of 2004, we will have enhanced satellite imagery with the helios II satellite. we expect to have all-weather (i.e. synthetic aperture radar) capabilities in the coming years, with Germany and Italy for the moment, but perhaps other partners down the road. We also plan on enhancing our fleet of tactical UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Like the United States and a select number of other NATO allies, France relies heavily on precision-guided munitions. During operation "Allied force", the French air force actually expended more pgm's than "dumb bombs". We are planning on improving our stock of precision-guided munitions, with possible plans for sea-launched cruise-missiles at the end of the decade to complement the air-launched ones that will be coming on-line shortly (the apache or scalp missile co-developed with the united kingdom). Starting in 2006, the entry into service of the rafale new generation fighter will also contribute to our sea-based force projection capabilities.

It is in the field of capabilities such as command and control, strategic lift or intelligence that the fifteen recognized that, more so than for forces, there still remained significant shortfalls. These are to be addressed by initiatives that have been agreed to EU nations on a bilateral or multilateral level. Witness, for example, the 225 orders for the future large aircraft, or A-400 M, by seven European countries, or the Franco-Dutch initiative on strategic sealift, that was agreed by our two defense ministers last year.

Now, there are shortfalls, and we all know what these are. One of our objectives at the capabilities commitment conference was to establish a roadmap for improved deployability, sustainability, interoperability of the forces, and for greater strategic capabilities, such as intelligence, especially in the space segment, and so on. In passing, may I mention that you probably recognize the convergence of our force process in the EU and NATO's defense capabilities initiative (DCI). At the nice European council, we approved the principles for the setting up of a review mechanism that will allow us to carry out the quantitative and qualitative assessment of the forces committed to the rapid reaction force.

I would like to mention in passing that, as you can see, we are not just aiming at operations on the low end of the peace-keeping spectrum as I have sometimes heard.

2 - I sometimes hear people complaining about the fact that the EU is not working to improve its capabilities, but just creating new institutions. Not only is this inaccurate on the first count, as I have just explained, but as for institutions, we are simplifying, not multiplying European institutions, with functions of the Western European Union (WEU) being taken over by the European Union. The capacity to take decisions and to conduct EU-led military operations requires the adequate politico-military decision-making structures, procedures and expertise. January 22, decisions were taken to allow these new EU structures (the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff) to be up and running in their permanent configuration, taking over from their interim one.

I might add that those new institutions that are being created are those which fulfill the objective of allowing consultation and cooperation with NATO and with non-EU countries, two essential goals.

I have heard some concern on the part of members of the out-going administration, and can guess similar questions will be asked by the incoming team. I would be happy, if you so wish, to go more deeply in the Question and Answer session into some of the specific issues that were raised, but allow me to briefly address one of them, that of Defense planning. There must be no room for ambiguity: no country of the European Union wants to set up a separate EU body in charge of operational planning, an "EU SHAPE" if you will, as is sometimes implied here, in order to duplicate NATO or national operational planning capabilities. The European military staff, which is to be some 100-members strong, will have strategic planning among its many responsibilities. In the case of an eu-led operation with recourse to NATO assets, operational planning will obviously be carried out by shape. In the case of an autonomous eu operation, relying only on EU assets, then, we envisage a recourse to existing = national = planning capabilities, and particularly the capabilities of the two only EU countries that can be used in a multinational framework, the UK and France. It is important to point out that these are capabilities which we already have - there is no issue of squandering of resources therefore. Not using them would be a waste, for example if one insisted that shape must be used whatever the scenario. There is full agreement between the fifteen, including Britain and France on this issue, as there has been from the very beginning. I trust that we will be able to foil the attempts of those who, in Washington or in some quarters in London, would like to create a false problem where there is none.

Let's not allow the trees to hide the forest. As I said earlier, the crucial element to bear in mind is that we were at a turning point in the history of the European Union, of the Atlantic Alliance and of transatlantic relations. Obviously, a turn for the better. Let me explain why, by placing our projects in a wider perspective, on which I would like to share French views.

B. What is it we want ?

European defense is almost always discussed here in relation to NATO, the transatlantic link and the burdensharing debate. We can understand this perspective, and have no difficulties with it: the transatlantic link is as essential to us as it is for the U.S., everybody agrees (even the awful French) that NATO is the cornerstone of our common defense, and the concern about burdensharing is legitimate. However, in order to fully grasp current and future developments in this field, it is very important to understand that for us, European defense has both deeper roots and wider implications.

Although it emerged later than other components of the EU's foreign policy, European defense is an integral part of this picture. Indeed, after trade integration, monetary integration, and foreign policy integration (CFSP), Europe is now turning toward a common security and defense policy. Hence this is not an isolated development, but one that needs to be placed in its proper historic context.

Defense is for Europe both a foundation and an extension of an effective foreign policy. A foundation of foreign policy because there are circumstances where, in order to be credible – and thus effective – diplomacy needs to be backed by the threat of force. An extension of foreign policy because we need to have military capabilities at our disposal in order to implement our foreign policy, just in the same way that we dispose today of purely economic or diplomatic instruments.

After the Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo both contributed, in their own way, to the realization by Europeans of the unacceptable nature of some of their military shortcomings. Bosnia, especially for countries such as the United Kingdom and France, whose forces on the ground suffered substantial losses, was largely synonymous with the paralysis of Europe when the United States decides to stay away from a crisis (you will recall James baker's assertion that the U.S. did not "have a dog in that fight"). Kosovo, on the other hand, was indeed a wake-up call in the other direction, at least as far as air power is concerned: today, on the ground, some 85% of forces are European.

I think it is fair to say, however, that the major turning point for European defense was the shift of the British position in the autumn of 1998. The UK's traditional reserve toward European defense had constituted, until recently, a significant obstacle to the development of any European defense initiative, given the fact that the United Kingdom is, along with France, one of the only European nations with significant military projection capabilities. They are the two countries that spend most for their defense in terms of GDP, and the most on defense procurement and R & D. France, as I am sure you know, was the first European contributor to operation Allied Force in Kosovo, followed by the UK.

The UK's wholehearted endorsement of European defense was all the more valuable given its close ties with the United States. In brief, it took a new crisis in Kosovo, and Prime Minister Blair's new and fresh approach of European Defense, to give us a new deal.

C. Where are we heading ? And where are we not heading ?

What should you expect over the coming years on the issue of European defense?

I see two main issues that we need to address: the most important one is meeting our Helsinki commitments and strengthening our capabilities even after 2003; furthermore, we must do so in a way that allows for a healthy Alliance, that is to say a more balanced one.

- Strengthened capabilIties

Regarding the core commitment on capabilities, I am sure that many of you wonder how the EU will be able to achieve in such a short time-frame something that we have struggled with in the NATO framework for many years. We have no magic recipe. Ultimately, the answer lies in European capitals, for that is where, as in the United States, the hard political choices are made on the allocation of economic resources: on the national level. I think it is fair to say, however, that the more European citizens and taxpayers feel involved in what their money is used for, the more they are ready to contribute. Politically, the incentive is different in the NATO force planning system, which is more bureaucratic than political, and highly integrated instead of being based on the primary responsibility – and therefore political accountability – of individual nations.

I should emphasize, however, that this isn't only about spending more, but really, for a great number of countries, about spending better. This isn't a way to weasel out of our commitments, but a simple factual assertion. The UK and France, for example, have actually decreased their defense spending over the last ten years while substantially increasing the military capabilities that they can effectively and rapidly project and sustain in a hostile theater.

A Healthier Transatlantic Link

At the risk of repetition, the strengthening of European Defense will not in any way undermine the role of NATO. Quite to the contrary. A Europe that remains allied to the U.S. simply because of its own weakness is of limited value. A stronger and more assertive Europe is in everyone's interest, on both sides of the Atlantic. Developing the capacity to achieve the objectives set out in Helsinki will involve increasing a strengthening of Member States' forces as well as reinforcing the interoperability of their respective forces. This can only be to the advantage of NATO, since 11 of the 15 member states are NATO members.

The notion that the EU and NATO could compete with one another seems to me to totally miss the point, not only for the reasons pointed out above but especially because these are two organizations of a wholly different nature. The EU is a political Union, with economic, monetary, social, legal, agricultural (...) policies. NATO is an alliance with, at its heart, a military security commitment. Nothing more, nothing less.

And we are not in the business of building a new military alliance. We are in the business of building a union, which is something entirely different, and of course quite compatible with the continuing existence of the good alliance that the Atlantic Alliance is.

There is much at stake, both for the future of the EU's foreign and security policy, and therefore for our ability as Europeans to play our role on the world stage, and for the transatlantic link as well. We have taken the full measure of what is at stake and are pleased to see that quarreling and suspicion we met at the outset have largely given way, on this side of the Atlantic, to a better understanding of our common interests and our shared objective. We trust that this trend will continue with the new administration, that will necessarily take some time to re-assess all of these different issues.

III. Security in a wider sense - Dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction : Common objectives, different approaches ?

I would like to briefly address the issue of weapons of mass destruction, that is usually not dealt with directly in relation to European defense, but that certainly has implications for the defense of Europe, as it does for Euro-American relations and for global security. Again, without overly exaggerating the divergences between Europe and the United States, I feel it is important to voice some questions.

In Europe and in France, we have the impression that today the entire system of non-proliferation is threatened. The dismaying decision by the United States Senate in October 1999 to reject the CTBT must not serve as a pretext for other States who have either not signed or not ratified the test ban treaty to shy away from their obligations - to the contrary. It did however further slow down the momentum in favor of non-proliferation that had built up over the first half of the 1990s and cast an ominous shadow on the entire multilateral non-proliferation regime. The deadlock on most other disarmament and proliferation issues is worrisome: the start process is now suspended to U.S. Senate's ratification of the 1997 Helsinki start and ABM protocols and demarcation agreements, which will not come any time soon I suspect. Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty have yet to start in Geneva; progress on the negotiation of a protocol to enhance the effectiveness of the 1972 convention on biological and toxin weapons is grindingly slow, and on this question the United States' very restrictive negotiating position does not make things any easier.

American intentions regarding the deployment of a national missile defense raise some very important questions. France, both as a country actively involved in arms control and non-proliferation efforts and as a close European ally, has a viewpoint that has often been misconstrued here. It is not up to France to decide how the American government will decide to protect the United States. It is however up to us (and to other key allies such as the United Kingdom or Germany, for whom I do not wish to speak, but who have made their concerns known in no uncertain terms, as has Lord Robertson, NATO's Secretary General) to make our concerns known to an ally as close as the United States, so that they can be taken into account in the internal decision-making process. These concerns have mainly to do with the consequences of an NMD deployment.

First of all, we are concerned that, in the current context, the announcement by the United States that it will deploy a new weapons system could provide a pretext for proliferating states that want to avoid new constraints - and we know that there are many of those. It will actually be more difficult to convince such countries, some of them in areas of great regional tensions, to accept new limitations when the world's main super-power considers it necessary to acquire new types of weapons more sophisticated than any we have seen before, to face a threat that seems overblown to us. France, and the great majority of NATO allies regard the American threat assessment with great skepticism. Perhaps unlike you, we do not equate security with invulnerability. The uniquely American vision of so-called "rogue States" (whatever the P.C. terminology du jour may be at the state department) that inherently harbor evil intentions regardless of their strategic calculations is difficult to share. For the Europeans, NMD will actually most likely reinforce the ballistic programs of these countries. Firstly, in symbolic terms, the message that you are giving is that you are more afraid of a single hypothetical North-Korean ICBM than you believe that North Korea is afraid of all the military might, conventional and nuclear, that you could bring to bear on it. For those countries that have the possibility of developing their ballistic program both quantitatively and qualitatively (mirving, counter-measures, etc.) NMD is an incentive to do so, in order for them to maintain a deterrent capability.

Furthermore, we fear that such a move would undermine the ABM treaty. Needless to say, a unilateral withdrawal by the U.S. would be catastrophic and, coming on the heels of the rejection of the CTBT, would be another nail in the coffin of the international system of nonproliferation that we have jointly developed over the last 30 years. Such a development could also only be prejudicial to the Alliance's cohesion. However, even an agreed revision to the ABM treaty would have consequences for stability, for example in east Asia. China's accelerated modernization of its strategic forces in case of an NMD deployment (something that everybody recognizes as perfectly plausible, including the Pentagon if one reads its latest report on proliferation) could only have negative consequences, for example, for stability in South Asia, since India could not keep its arms crossed in the face of such a development.

Some other concerns that we have related to the impact of NMD on deterrence (not the French deterrent per se, but on the very concept of deterrence) and more generally the message it sends regarding non-proliferation efforts, which seems to be : "none of that stuff works, let's give up on it and protect ourselves". And this message is just as worrisome to Europeans whether you just protect yourselves or propose to protect Europeans as well : no matter how frustrating and slow negotiated arms control and non-proliferation agreements are, they offer, when implemented, results that no unilateral military tool can offer : nipping NMD in the bud, instead of witnessing their proliferation and hoping to set up a hypothetical (and necessarily imperfect) shield.

In sum, I think it is fair to say that we have serious concerns, and that we hope that they will be taken into account in the American domestic debate and decision-making process more thoroughly than in the Senate debate on the CTBT a year and a half ago. This is the reason for which, as close allies, we have consistently asked the U.S. administration for close consultations on this issue and look forward to seeing how the incoming administration will acquit itself of this commitment it has made.

I would like to conclude my presentation with a very simple message, before turning to a discussion that I look forward to. We are privileged enough, on both sides of the Atlantic, to be at peace, prosperous, with no direct vital threat similar to those that our nations have known for the previous century, certainly as far as the second half of it is concerned. Such occasions do not present themselves often in history, and it is our duty, both political and moral, to seize upon them when they are here.

We need to remember that despite our differences, the U.S. has no other ally, nor partner, with which it shares so many interests, as Europe and neither for that matter does Europe. A real partnership however is one which allows us not only to address our common challenges jointly but also to discuss differences maturely, and to act together on the world scene to implement policies decided concurrently. This is the type of partnership that the European Union is striving to implement. I trust that this objective is shared by the United States.